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RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0922
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0874
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0020
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0128
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1247
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0220
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0058
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0442
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0061
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 2168
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000326

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SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF AND YUDHOYONO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST CRISES

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 609

[1](#)B. JAKARTA 253

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Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, Reasons 1.4(b,d)

[11.](#) (C) SUMMARY: Official Indonesian and Pakistani sources in Jakarta provided a detailed readout of the discussion between Pakistani President Musharraf and Indonesian President Yudhoyono on January 31 in Jakarta, where Musharraf presented a plan for a summit, to be held in Saudi Arabia in March, which would issue a declaration setting a way forward on Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon. Jordan, Egypt, Malaysia, Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan as well as Hamas and Fatah would participate. Musharraf's initiative responds to the growing rift between Sunnis and Shi'as in the Middle East and Iraq and attempts to offer a "moderate voice." Yudhoyono endorsed Musharraf's proposal and agreed to Indonesia's participation, and proposed sponsoring a parallel meeting of Sunni and Shi'a imams in Bogor, Indonesia which would issue a fatwah. Musharraf is pitching his proposal to other capitals on his tour of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. End Summary.

INDONESIAN READOUT OF MUSHARRAF-YUDHOYONO MEETING

[12.](#) (C) Ambassador met with Dino Patti Djalal, National Security Adviser to Indonesian President Yudhoyono, on February 7 to discuss Yudhoyono's meeting with Pakistani President Musharraf in Jakarta on January 31. Djalal related the following.

¶3. (C) The main topic of discussion and the purpose of the brief visit to Jakarta was Musharraf's proposal to mobilize Muslim countries to take action in the Middle East to resolve growing divisions in the Islamic community, most notably between Sunnis and Shi'as (ref A). Musharraf believed the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was too weak and Arab states were unable to resolve the problem alone, and other Islamic countries, including Pakistan and Indonesia, must assist to offer a "moderate voice" of direction. Musharraf wanted to enlist the support of seven states in particular (three Arab, four non-Arab): Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey and Pakistan.

¶4. (C) Musharraf envisioned a summit conference of the leaders of these states which would issue a declaration concerning Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon. The summit would be held in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in early March and would be attended by representatives of Hamas and Fatah. Syria and Iran were deliberately omitted from the list of prospective participants because were potential spoilers. The seven would work actively with the United States, the European Union and the other members of the Middle East Quartet and would also try to engage Syria and Iran. (Note. Musharraf is also visiting Tehran and Damascus, presumably to solicit their cooperation. End note.)

¶5. (C) Djalal said that Musharraf wanted the summit declaration to include the following elements:

-- creation of a Palestinian state by 2008 (the headline;
-- explicit endorsement of a two-state solution, i.e.
recognition of the reality of Israel by all participating
states;
-- direct dialogue between Israel and Syria, including on the
Golan Heights;

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-- direct dialogue between the United States and Iran;
-- international participation in the reconstruction of
Palestine.

Musharraf hoped that the consensus represented by the statement would lead Hamas to recognize Israel.

¶6. (C) Djalal said Yudhoyono told Musharraf that Indonesia supported the proposal and wanted to participate. Yudhoyono proposed that meetings occur at the foreign minister level first to set the stage for the summit and agree to the text of a declaration.

¶7. (C) Yudhoyono also told Musharraf, Djalal said, of Indonesia's plans to hold a conference of Sunni and Shi'a imams in Bogor (south of Jakarta) on February 14-15, hosted by the chairman of the Indonesian Islamic organization Nadlatul Ulama (NU). Upon hearing Musharraf's proposal, Yudhoyono agreed to postpone the conference until March, to synchronize it with the Mecca summit, and in view of the fact that Qatar recently had tried unsuccessfully to orchestrate a similar conference. The Bogor conference would issue a fatwa as a counterpart to the declaration of state leaders in Mecca. To reduce the possibility that the Bogor conference might issue a radical statement, Yudhoyono proposed the formation of a steering committee which would select the imams to be invited to the conference.

¶8. (C) Djalal also related that, in view of the meeting Saudi leaders had just held with leaders of Hamas and Fatah in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia was shelving a plan of its own to invite Hamas to Jakarta for discussions in a similar vein (ref B).

¶9. (C) Ambassador observed that the second of the "three principles" on Iraq that Yudhoyono had announced during President Bush's visit to Indonesia in November 2006 involved the recognition of the state of Israel, and inquired whether Indonesia intended to take this step in the scenario

Musharraf was now proposing. Djalal affirmed Indonesia would do this, as one of the states issuing the declaration. "Indonesia will recognize Israel," he clarified, "as soon as a state of Palestine exists." He added that he was not sure about the other states involved.

¶10. (C) On the margins of Ambassador's meeting with Djalal, one of Djalal's staffers told DCM that Musharraf had seemed extremely edgy throughout the 90-minute meeting with Yudhoyono. Part of this the staffer attributed to the bombings in Islamabad during Musharraf's absence, but much of it was due, he asserted, to the cool reception Musharraf had received from Arab states. Egypt and Syria in particular had raised a host of objections, essentially rejecting the proposal.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY FROM PAKISTANI EMBASSY

¶11. (C) Poloffs also called on Shujat Ali Rathore, the Embassy of Pakistan's Political Counselor, on February 7. Although Rathore said he had no specifics on the meeting itself, he confirmed that President Musharraf's visit was intended to help resolve the Palestinian crisis and bridge an emerging Sunni-Shi'a divide in the Muslim world. Musharraf believed it was time for Muslims to act in concert on these issues. Musharraf was beginning with a broad agenda during this initial round of consultations, which would be narrowed down depending on other states' reactions.

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¶12. (C) Rathore spoke at some length about the negative impact Pakistan believed the Iraq war was having on the Muslim world and its corrosive effect on Sunni-Shi'a relations in particular. Musharraf was concerned about the consequences of a U.S. departure from Iraq before a degree of stability was established. If this happened, he warned, the Middle East map would be redrawn. Rathore lamented the increasing involvement of "state actors" in the Sunni-Shi'a conflict, citing Saudi Arabia and Egypt as the primary supporters of the Sunnis and Iran as the Shi'as' chief patron. This had worsened, he contended, after Secretary Rice's most recent visit to the Middle East, with the Saudis and Egyptians now turning up the level of anti-Iran rhetoric.

¶13. (C) Rathore took issue with Pakistani media reports criticizing Musharraf for undertaking this mission and suggesting Pakistan lacked sufficient weight to tackle these issues. Of all countries in the region, Pakistan would be the most negatively affected if the Sunni-Shi'a conflict worsened. Pakistan's security services were not strong enough to keep sectarian violence from spinning out of control, unlike the situation in countries like Syria. Groups affiliated with Saudi Arabia and Iran were already operating in Pakistan and could be "stoked up" at a moment's notice. Pakistan would also be a direct casualty of any U.S. military attack on Iran, given Pakistan's significant Shi'a minority, especially along the border with Iran.

¶14. (C) Asked if Indonesia had credibility with Arab leaders, Rathore asserted it did not. "Arabs are introverts; they listen to themselves," he explained. "They are Arabs first, and then Muslims." As part of a "coalition of the willing," however, as Musharraf was seeking to build, Indonesia could help resolve these festering issues from within the Muslim community.

PASCOE